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DETERMINISM AND DIVINE BLAME
John Ross Churchill

Theological determinism is, at first glance, difficult to square with the typical Christian commitment to the appropriateness of divine blame. How, we
may wonder, can it be appropriate for God to blame someone for something
that was determined to occur by God in the first place? In this paper, I try to
clarify this challenge to Christian theological determinism, arguing that its
most cogent version includes specific commitments about what is involved
when God blames wrongdoers. I then argue that these commitments are not
essential to divine blame, and that there are plausible alternative accounts
of such blame that would not court similar challenges. I end with a case for
the intelligibility of divine blame within theological determinism, in light of
its possible similarity in relevant respects to certain instances of intelligible
human blame.

I. Introduction
It is a great irony of Mary Shelley’s Frankenstein that the creator is so monstrous. Having built and animated his creation, Victor abandons him at
the first signs of life, leaving his creature with no one to care for or guide
him, in a world that will receive him only as a source of fear and disgust.
This mistreatment makes it hard to accept the legitimacy of Victor’s later
condemnation of his creature, leading many of us to recoil at tirades like
the following:
“Why do you call to my remembrance,” I rejoined, “circumstances, of which
I shudder to reflect, that I have been the miserable origin and author? Cursed
be the day, abhorred devil, in which you first saw light! Cursed (although I
curse myself) be the hands that formed you! You have made me wretched
beyond expression. You have left me no power to consider whether I am just
to you or not. Begone! relieve me from the sight of your detested form.”1

Indeed, we may find ourselves sympathizing with the creature as he addresses his “heartless creator” and asks, “Why did you form a monster so
hideous that even you turned from me in disgust?”2

Shelley, Frankenstein; or, The Modern Prometheus, 101.
Shelley, Frankenstein; or, The Modern Prometheus, 139 and 130.
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Accusations are likewise hard to stomach when the accuser himself
has orchestrated the wrongful action. Iago may not have created and subsequently abandoned anyone in his campaign against Othello. But we
are nevertheless repulsed at his indictment of Othello’s beloved Cassio,
having watched Iago manipulate Cassio into committing his crime.
Given all this, what are we to make of a being who exercises total control over another’s wrongdoing and yet still blames the perpetrator for
that wrongdoing? How much more should we recoil when the blamer’s
control over the wrongdoer’s actions extends beyond the creation of the
wrongdoer, and beyond even an ability to play expertly upon his desires,
fears, and the like?
This sentiment—the judgment that someone with total control over
another’s behavior cannot appropriately blame the person so controlled—
forms the basis of an objection to an account of God’s sovereignty that is
quite popular in many Christian denominations, an account we will refer
to here as theological determinism. This account has been championed in
the past by influential Christian theologians like John Calvin and Jonathan Edwards, and it claims many adherents in the academy and churches
today. Because Christian theological determinists want to affirm both total
divine control over human behavior and the appropriateness of divine
blame, they face a direct threat from considerations like those above.
In the sections to come, I first introduce this deterministic approach
to God’s sovereignty and contrast it with competing approaches. I then
present what I take to be the strongest objection to the appropriateness of
divine blame on this approach, drawing in part from recent articulations
of this objection. My response will be to highlight and reject some of the
assumptions about divine blame that are implicit in the challenge, and to
suggest plausible alternative conceptions of divine blame that would not
court similar challenges. I then close with a case for the intelligibility of
divine blame within theological determinism, one that trades on analogous instances of intelligible human blame. If these considerations are
cogent, they would provide a way for those who wish to endorse both the
all-encompassing divine sovereignty of theological determinism and the
appropriateness of divine blame to do so without fear of incoherence or
the need to appeal to mystery on these matters.
This would be a modest conclusion, but an important one nonetheless. For determinism of the relevant sort remains a common view among
theologians, clergy, and laypeople alike, even if it is a fringe view among
Christian philosophers. And unlike its rivals, this account does not require
that humans have libertarian free will, and so it is not hostage to the same
empirical fortunes as libertarianism. It would be significant, then, to know
that a popular Christian view of God’s sovereignty that is compatible with
a wide range of discoveries in the science of human agency is fully consistent with, and intelligible with respect to, traditional commitments on
divine blame.
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II. Preliminary Matters
Before tackling these topics, however, some preliminary clarifications are
in order.
First, it’s important to note that the present paper is focused on divine blame, and not on human moral responsibility. These are related
concepts, to be sure. For one condition on the appropriateness of God’s
blaming is that those who are blamed are morally responsible, in a sense
that is sufficient for them to be worthy of blame.3 Even so, the question of
whether a wrongdoer is worthy of blame is distinct from the question of
whether some specific person may appropriately blame that wrongdoer.
If I knowingly aid in your act of theft, for example, it may be that I cannot
legitimately blame you, despite the fact that you are fully blameworthy
for the act.4
Second, and similar to the first point, care must be taken not to conflate
divine blame with divine punishment in what follows. For blame and
punishment are plausibly distinct5—I may blame you without thereby
punishing you—even if considerations about the appropriateness of
blame are relevant to considerations about the appropriateness of punishment.6 As before, my focus here is on divine blame, and not on this related
but distinct concept. This will be especially important to keep in mind
in later sections, lest my proposed solution to an apparent problem for
divine blame be misinterpreted as something that is intended to handle
certain worries about divine punishment. (And it may be that what helps
a lot in the former case is of much less use in the latter.)
Finally, I want to make clear that the aim here is not to defend theological determinism as the best account of divine sovereignty. Rather, my
goal is simply to defend it against a rather thorny objection—an objection
that can lead philosophers to dismiss it as a live option. While I ultimately
conclude that this position ought not to be dismissed on these grounds, I
remain agnostic as to whether it is superior to any of its rivals, all things
considered.
3
I assume a concept of moral responsibility on which a responsible wrongdoer is one who
is worthy of or deserves blame regardless of any consequences that might follow from that blame.
I do so because I believe it to be common within the Christian tradition and standard in
challenges to theological determinism. This concept can be contrasted with views on which
blame is simply not something that anyone ever deserves, such that blaming is only justified
on instrumental grounds. For more on this distinction, see Michael McKenna, Conversation
and Responsibility, 114–148, and Derk Pereboom, “Libertarianism and Theological Determinism,” 113–119.
4
See the discussion in section 2.2.2 of Neal Tognazzini and Justin Coates, “Blame.”
5
McKenna offers several distinctions between punishment and blame in his Conversation
and Responsibility. For example, punishment often has a tit-for-tat structure (e.g., eye for eye)
that is atypical of blame (142). And it is possible to blame offenders without intending any
harm to them, while this is not possible in cases of punishment (144–146).
6
Perhaps it’s worth clarifying that I will not be arguing (and I do not assume) that there
are cases in which God is entitled to blame someone but not entitled to punish them, in the
way these two entitlements often come apart for humans. This is no part of my strategy later
in the paper.
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III. Theological Determinism
This is not the place to rehearse in detail the various approaches to divine
sovereignty within the Christian tradition.7 For present purposes, it will
be enough to highlight a distinctive characteristic of theological determinism, and contrast this aspect of the position with all other approaches.
This will provide sufficient background for the challenge and response to
follow in later sections.
What distinguishes theological determinism from rival approaches is
its affirmation that for any human action, the ultimate explanation as to why
the person acted as he did rather than acting otherwise (or refraining from acting)
is that God determined that he would so act. For example, while there are no
doubt natural explanations for Peter’s third denial of Christ—Peter’s fear
was surely a cause, for instance—the determinist will insist that the fundamental reason why Peter sinned precisely as he did rather than acting
otherwise is that God determined that he would sin in just that way.
It is true, of course, that alternatives to determinism also accord a role
to God’s will in the explanation of all human actions. Molinists and open
theists, for example, both affirm that God’s creation and conservation
are necessary conditions for such actions, and they may affirm that in
some cases God specifically determines such actions in the strong sense
articulated above. But both groups deny that in all cases, the ultimate explanation as to why an agent acted as she did rather than acting otherwise
(or refraining from action) is that God determined it to be so—preferring
in at least some cases to root the explanation in the agent herself or to deny
that there is any such explanation. Theological determinists part ways
with proponents of both groups in affirming, as Thomas Flint has put it,
that “all actions are determined ultimately by events external to and not
under the causal control of their agents,”8 with God as the external source
in question.
Similarly, there are many views of divine sovereignty on which God
exercises providential control over human affairs.9 But the degree of divine control exercised according to the different views will vary along a
spectrum, with determinism as the limiting case of total divine control in
virtue of God’s specific determination of all human behavior.10
7
Others have done so admirably. For articulations and defense of the Molinist approach
to divine sovereignty, see for example Thomas Flint’s Divine Providence: The Molinist Account
and Kenneth Keathley’s Salvation and Sovereignty: A Molinist Approach. Resources that favor
open theism include William Hasker’s God, Time, and Knowledge and Providence, Evil, and
the Openness of God, and John Sanders’s The God Who Risks: A Theology of Divine Providence.
Theological determinism is defended in John S. Feinberg’s No One Like Him, Paul Helm’s The
Providence of God and Eternal God, and Hugh J. McCann’s Creation and the Sovereignty of God.
8
Flint, “Providence,” 331.
9
See for example the discussions of divine providence within Molinist and Open Theist
accounts in the resources listed above.
10
I take it that control assumes some kind of asymmetry—at the very least, if one thing
controls another, then the second depends on the first in a way that the first does not depend
on the second. This is true of theological determinism as presented above, in God’s control
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Note, importantly, that theological determinism allows for a plurality
of theories as to how God determines creatures’ behavior. It is thus consistent with multiple positions on God’s relation to evil human actions and,
relatedly, with multiple positions on the causal structure of the world.
Various accounts of God’s control over human evil are on offer,11 but all
parties agree that God’s reasons for determining such behavior will differ
significantly from the reasons for determining good behavior, in such a
way as to safeguard divine goodness; they will, in other words, agree with
D. A. Carson that “God does not stand behind evil action in the way that
he stands behind good action.”12 As far as the causal structure of the world
is concerned, a theological determinist may, but need not, defend the truth
of causal determinism. It is therefore open to her to claim that while (e.g.)
the laws and the various physical and mental states of the world prior to
Peter’s sin were jointly consistent with his acting virtuously, Peter’s denial
was nevertheless determined by God.13
This leads to another important clarification. Theological determinism
is sometimes understood in causal terms, e.g., as the thesis that God is
the sufficient cause of everything that exists, or of everything that happens,
within the creation.14 I take such characterizations to fit comfortably with
my own. Even so, it’s important to keep in mind that theological determinists need not (and should not) deny that behavior that is divinely
determined is also typically caused by agents’ normal psychological states
and processes. Divine determination, in other words, does not preclude
the causation that we take to be crucial to ordinary, natural agency; it is
fully consistent with Peter’s fears (beliefs, desires, etc.) counting as factors
that contributed causally to his action.
Much more could be said about theological determinism and how it
differs from its rivals. But the distinction above is what defines the position

over what creatures there are, as well as what those creatures do and what happens to them.
For an apparent account on which God is the cause of creatures and their behavior, but in
a way that rejects any asymmetry (and thus control) of this sort, see W. Matthews Grant,
“Divine Universal Causality and Libertarian Freedom.”
11
See for example Jonathan Edwards, Freedom of the Will, part IV, section XI, subsection III;
Feinberg, No One Like Him, 651–656; Helm, Eternal God, 162–164, and The Providence of God,
chs. 7–8; Charles Hodge, Systematic Theology, Vol. I, 402–404; and McCann, Creation and the
Sovereignty of God, ch. 6. See also Helm and Feinberg (respectively) on Calvin on this subject
in John Calvin’s Ideas, 165–171, and No One Like Him, 696. Also helpful is Flint’s discussion (but
not endorsement) of this issue within the position he calls “Thomism” in Divine Providence,
87–94. Some of my comments in section IV are relevant as well.
12
Carson, Divine Sovereignty and Human Responsibility, 36.
13
McCann is an example of a theological determinist that rejects causal determinism,
while Edwards affirms both theological and causal determinism. See McCann’s “Edwards
on Free Will” and Creation and the Sovereignty of God, ch. 5, and Edwards’s Freedom of the Will,
part II, section X. See also Feinberg’s No One Like Him, 716–718, and Flint’s discussion of the
“Thomistic” approach in “Two Accounts of Providence,” 172–173, Divine Providence, 87, and
“Divine Providence,” 266–268.
14
See Pereboom, “Libertarianism and Theological Determinism,” 112, and O’Connor,
“Against Theological Determinism,” 133, respectively.
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of interest, and it is what serves as the basis for philosophical challenges to
its plausibility. I now turn now to one such challenge.15
IV. The Problem of Divine Blame
I noted earlier that the deterministic approach to divine sovereignty is
popular across a number of Christian audiences. It’s not uncommon for
members of these audiences to see this aspect of God’s nature as a cause
for gratitude and love, and as a basis for peace and strength. For it means,
among other things, that the God who loves them and who seeks their
highest good has left no part of the divine plan for their lives vulnerable
to defeat by imperfect creatures, protecting them from themselves no less
than from others.16
However, there are elements of Christian theology that make this account of divine sovereignty much harder to celebrate. Indeed, one such
element seems at first blush to render determinism implausible at best,
and incoherent at worst. I’m speaking here of divine blame.
It doesn’t take much reflection to see the apparent difficulty. In addition
to their preferred view of divine sovereignty, determinists typically want
to affirm that God blames wrongdoers, where such blame is entirely appropriate. That is, wrongdoers are taken to be worthy of blame, and God is
counted among those who are entitled to blame them. But it is hard prima
facie to see how theological determinists can coherently maintain both of
these commitments. For it is not at all obvious how it can be appropriate
for God to blame someone for wrongdoing that was due ultimately and
specifically to divine determination. If, in other words, God determined
Peter to act exactly as he did rather than otherwise—if divine determination was the ultimate explanation for that outcome—it is puzzling, to say
15
One might wonder why I have chosen the label “theological determinism,” or often
simply “determinism,” rather than referring to this position via one of its more famous alleged proponents, as is common. In other words, why not Augustinianism, or Calvinism, or
perhaps even Thomism? I prefer “determinism” because it is a term with some currency at
present (see for example the many contributions in Kevin Timpe and Daniel Speak’s Free
Will and Theism), and because it conveys only a fairly general thesis that is often attributed
to these and other theologians without suggesting additional content peculiar to any one of
them. (Gregory Boyd defends the endorsement of Augustine as a theological determinist in
his Satan and the Problem of Evil, 249. Helm places Calvin in this tradition in John Calvin’s Ideas,
170–171, and Calvin at the Centre, 259. In The God Who Risks, Sanders counts Luther [155] as a
theological determinist alongside Augustine [149–153] and Calvin [156–157]. See the previous
references to Edwards as theological determinist above. Flint presents Bañez and Leibniz as
theological determinists, and thinks it possible that Aquinas may have held this position,
too [“Two Accounts of Providence,” 149, “Providence,” 332]. Hodge falls in this category as
well; see 440–441 of Vol. I and 301–302 of Volume II of his Systematic Theology, and Carson’s
comments in Divine Sovereignty and Human Responsibility, 207 and 254n4. Note, importantly,
that Jesse Couenhoven rejects the characterization of Augustine as a theological determinist
[though not as “a kind of compatibilist”] in his Stricken by Sin, Cured by Christ, 13, 104–105.)
16
See for example Charles Spurgeon’s comments on Matthew 20:15, quoted in Arthur W.
Pink, The Attributes of God, 32–33. See also David Fergusson, Creation, 57; Martin Luther, The
Bondage of the Will, 313; Pereboom, “Libertarianism and Theological Determinism,” 114–115;
and Hodge, Systematic Theology, Vol. I, 441, and Vol. II, 301–302, the latter of which includes
the gem “Who would not rather be governed by a Father than by a tornado?”

DETERMINISM AND DIVINE BLAME

431

the least, how it can be appropriate for God to blame Peter for that very
action. Patrick Todd sums up this sentiment well in a recent paper:
[S]uppose you “wake up” to find yourself in an afterlife, during which time
it is somehow made clear that everything you ever did was part of a divine
preordained plan. And then God says to you: “You know, what you did on
this occasion was really a horrible thing to have done. What’s your excuse?
How could you?” Isn’t there something deeply unsettling about this scenario? Wouldn’t you suppose that something had gone completely wrong?
In the end, it simply seems to me that if God determines us to perform an
action, he cannot blame us for having performed it. I do not know how to
argue for this claim. I simply say that it is eminently plausible, and that we
would need some very good reason to deny it.17

The apparent problem generalizes, of course, given that the view counts
all human actions as divinely determined in this way. Moreover, it poses a
significant challenge, as the reality and legitimacy of divine blame is taken
as a staple of Christian belief across many traditions.18 It seems, then, that
short of appeal to mystery, one cost of the deterministic account of divine
sovereignty is the highly revisionist denial that God ever blames anyone
for their wrongdoing.
Todd’s recent work in this space enables us to sharpen the objection
a bit.19 What exactly is it about the degree of divine control that appears
to undermine God’s ability to blame appropriately—God’s “standing to
blame,” as it is sometimes called? What is driving the intuition that he
articulates in the passage above?
It is not, Todd claims, that in determining that an act of wrongdoing
will occur, God is therefore guilty of that same act or kind of wrongdoing.20
God is not, that is, akin to a conspirator who cannot legitimately blame
her co-conspirators, or to a dishonest citizen who lacks the standing to
blame politicians for their lies. For in the relevant cases, the misdeeds are
performed by human agents, not by God; the divine determination of a
misdeed is distinct from the misdeed itself. Moreover, a creature’s wrong
action will have been performed for one set of reasons—indeed, these
reasons will be important to the action’s moral status—while God’s determination of that wrongdoing (along with its reasons) will have been for
other reasons. Even on the determinist’s account, it was not God but Peter
Todd, “Manipulation and Moral Standing,” 16.
See for example the treatment of divine wrath toward, or divine judgment of, sin in the
following: Articles 4, 9, and 12 of The Thirty-Nine Articles of Religion in J. I. Packer and R. T.
Beckwith, 6–10; ch. VI, section VI and ch. XXXIII, section I of The Westminster Confession of
Faith in A. A. Hodge, 115 and 389, respectively; and sections 678–679 of The Catechism of the
Catholic Church, 194–195.
19
Note that Todd’s specific focus in the paper is on the kind of theological determinism
that assumes causal determinism as well. (See 4–5 of “Manipulation and Moral Standing.”)
But the aspects of his case to be considered below apply equally against theological determinism more generally.
20
Todd, “Manipulation and Moral Standing,” 6–7. See also discussion of this point in
Flint, “Divine Providence,” 269, and ch. 6 of McCann’s Creation and the Sovereignty of God.
17
18
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who denied Christ, and Peter’s reasons for sinning were not God’s reasons
for determining that Peter would do so. God’s determination of a wrong
action does not entail that God has performed that same wrong action or
an action that is sufficiently similar in kind and moral status.
Nor, Todd argues, is the apparent problem for divine blame due to
God’s being at fault for the determination of the wrong behavior.21 For this
would require that God acted wrongly in determining such behavior, like
the mother who hypnotically induces her son to murder in The Manchurian Candidate. And the determinist can avail herself of resources familiar
to discussions of theodicy to reject this charge, such as the claim that
divine determination of wrong action is ultimately morally justified on
consequentialist grounds of one sort or another.22
I find Todd’s response plausible in each case. I also think he provides
a cogent response to the charge that divine standing to blame would be
undermined by God’s being complicit in the wrongdoing.23 Likewise for
his response to the claim that in blaming those who have been divinely
determined, God would thereby be professing to care about the moral
values at stake in the wrongdoing while nevertheless behaving in ways
that belie this profession.24
Even so, I cannot endorse Todd’s positive proposal, which is that the
real problem for theological determinism in this context is ultimately one
Todd, “Manipulation and Moral Standing,” 9.
See Helm, Eternal God (162–164) and The Providence of God (213–215), and Steven B.
Cowan and Greg A. Welty, “Pharaoh’s Magicians Redivivus,” 160–163, on these points. Note
that I am not endorsing such consequentialism here, only claiming it as a strategy open to the
theological determinist. See Feinberg’s No One Like Him, 787–795, and McCann’s Creation and
the Sovereignty of God, 120–121, for alternative defenses against the charge above.
23
Todd’s discussion is in “Manipulation and Moral Standing,” 10–11. Here is my gloss.
Not all situations in which one person orchestrates the misbehavior of another are such that
the first person lacks the standing to blame in virtue of being complicit in the misbehavior.
For the orchestrator’s reasons matter quite a bit to our judgments here. After all, most of us
accept that in at least some sting operations the undercover officers may legitimately blame
the persons that have been apprehended. The lesson seems to be that one’s reasons for engineering behavior factor into whether or not one is complicit in that behavior (or, if you prefer,
into whether or not one’s complicity is of a sort that undermines one’s standing to blame
others involved in the behavior). Given the rather weak assumption that the God of the
theological determinist is motivated by reasons that are, morally speaking, more like those of
a virtuous undercover agent than those of Iago, divine orchestration of wrongdoing is consistent with God’s appropriately blaming the wrongdoer. I take these same considerations
to count against Matt King’s conclusion that a divine determiner would lack the standing to
blame. See King, “Manipulation Arguments and the Moral Standing to Blame,” 4–9.
24
See p. 7 of “Manipulation and Moral Standing” for Todd’s discussion. See also
O’Connor’s “Against Theological Determinism,” 135–136. As an example of blame that
would be illegitimate on these grounds, consider Claudius’s false endorsement of reverence
for God and reverence for the dead in blaming Hamlet for his prolonged mourning, when
Claudius himself has dishonored both of these through his recent actions. Todd argues, and I
agree, that the determinist can use the resources of theodicy projects to respond here as well.
For divine determination of an action does not entail divine moral approval of that action
considered in itself, “in isolation from the rest of the story” (Todd, “Manipulation and Moral
Standing,” 7). Nor does it entail divine scorn for or indifference toward the values flouted by
that action, although it may entail that God subordinates these values to others.
21
22
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about human moral responsibility, and not about the appropriateness of divine blame per se. In particular, he argues that the problem with divine
blame on a view like determinism is that the agents would simply not be
morally responsible, in which case they would not be worthy of blame
whatsoever, and thus no one—not God or anyone else—could legitimately
blame them. Todd’s path to this conclusion is to prioritize his intuition
about divine blame within theological determinism, and then to offer as
the best explanation of this intuition—better than any alleged problem
with God’s distinctive standing to blame—the proposal that moral responsibility requires a kind of free will that creatures would lack if they
were determined by God to act as they do.25
But this conclusion is too hasty. For there is another interpretation of
the apparent problem for theological determinism that has thus far been
left out of the discussion, one that makes better sense of the judgment that
divine blame would be especially inappropriate if God determines the
misbehavior. Key to this construal of the problem is an assumption about
the nature of blame itself, namely, that the act of blaming involves making
a certain kind of demand of those blamed—a demand that, as we will see,
God would be disingenuous in making if theological determinism were
true. Among other virtues, this approach has the advantage of counting
theological determinism as uniquely problematic for God’s standing—it
identifies a distinctive problem in the case of the divine controller blaming
the controlled—rather than counting all blame, divine and human alike,
as equally problematic within a deterministic framework.
By way of introduction to this proposed alternative, look back at the
long quote from Todd above, taking note of the language involved in
the divine blame: “What’s your excuse? How could you?,” God asks.
This is familiar language in our everyday blaming practices. If I hear it
from a loved one, I recognize it as a demand to explain my behavior—to
give an account as to why I acted as I did rather than acting otherwise.
Furthermore, I recognize the demand as one that assumes that my explanation will provide no excuse or justification for my action, but rather
will end in my acknowledgment that I have behaved badly; indeed, in
25
This strategy raises an issue that is worth a longer discussion than I can give here. Todd
seems to believe that the fact that a view is “massively counterintuitive” constitutes strong
evidence that it is “overwhelmingly implausible” (“Manipulation and Moral Standing,” 16–
17); at any rate, the alleged counterintuitiveness of the claim that divine blame is legitimate
within theological determinism is treated as good evidence in favor of its implausibility.
But this strategy requires data and argumentation, and cannot simply be assumed. (This
is especially true given recent research on intuitions about related issues. For discussion of
recent work on intuitions concerning moral responsibility, see John Ross Churchill, “Intuition, Orthodoxy, and Moral Responsibility.” See also Tamler Sommers’s argument in Part I of
Relative Justice that moral responsibility intuitions vary significantly across cultures, and his
use of this argument to defend the coherence of theological determinism and human moral
responsibility in “Relative Responsibility and Theism.” And for recent empirical evidence
of significant cultural variation in judgments relevant to assessing moral responsibility, see
Clark Barrett et al., “Small-scale Societies Exhibit Fundamental Variation in the Role of Intentions in Moral Judgment.”)
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this sense the questions are more like expressions of shock or incredulity
at my behavior than requests for information. And—to come to the key
point—such a demand from God would seem to be deeply problematic
within the framework of theological determinism, on the grounds that it
would be insincere in the extreme. For surely the God who has determined
me to sin—where such determination is the fundamental reason why I
sin rather than refrain—cannot sincerely confront me with anything like
shocked or incredulous demands that I explain that very sin. “How could
you?,” in the sense intended here, cannot be expressed sincerely by the
being who determined not only that I could, but that I would commit the
wrong for which I am being blamed. Todd is no doubt in good company
in finding divine blame of this sort “deeply unsettling.”26
It’s important to note that this kind of demand is by no means contrived.
Rather, as multiple philosophers have argued of late, it is common in our
ordinary blaming practices.27 Moreover, it appears in some presentations
of divine blame within the Christian tradition, as in the famous “Song of
the Vineyard” from the book of Isaiah.28 Taken at face value, that song sits
ill with theological determinism, as God’s blaming of Israel—couched in
questions of the form “What more could I have done?”—would thereby
be disingenuous. (After all, on the deterministic account, there was plenty
more God could have done to improve Israel’s behavior.)
Moreover, the apparent insincerity would be unique to God, which
means that it would serve to constitute a specific challenge to divine blame.
Those who initially took the apparent problem to be especially difficult for
God’s standing will see this as fitting. It’s true, of course, that theological
determinism is often taken to be inconsistent with human moral responsibility, and therefore inconsistent with any legitimate blame, human or
divine; Todd’s intuitions on this point are not idiosyncratic. But even so,
some of us see in the problem of divine blame something distinctively
problematic about God’s blaming behavior—i.e., something uniquely
troubling about the determiner blaming the determined. This interpretation
of the problem is preserved if we understand the difficulty as one that
is ultimately about the apparent insincerity of the blamer. But it is lost
on Todd’s account, which casts all blame—human and divine—as equally
problematic under theological determinism.

26
Compare Paul Russell’s charge that controllers cannot blame those they control because
“[m]oral communication and responsiveness presupposes that agents are not related to each
other as controller and controllee,” as well as his likening of such blame to a situation in
which an author criticizes one of his fictional characters through a dialogue with that character. See Russell, “Selective Hard Compatibilism,” 159 and 171n20, respectively.
27
See for example Russell, “Selective Hard Compatibilism,” and Angela Smith, “Responsibility for Attitudes: Activity and Passivity in Mental Life,” 269–271, and “Control,
Responsibility, and Moral Assessment,” 380–382. See also McKenna’s discussion of overt
blaming in the presence of the person blamed in Conversation and Responsibility, 174–178 (esp.
176), along with his list of the ways in which reactive attitudes manifest themselves on 67.
28
See Isaiah 5:1–7.
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We seem, then, to have arrived at a distinctive problem for divine
blame within theological determinism. This problem does not turn on a
requirement that in determining the misbehavior of the agents that are
to blame, God would be guilty of wrongdoing. Nor does it assume that
a God who determines an agent to perform a wrong action cannot care
about the values flouted by that wrong action. Moreover, it is a problem
that specifically concerns God’s standing to blame those who have been
divinely determined, rather than threatening to undermine the legitimacy
of all blame everywhere by challenging the moral responsibility of all
agents. This threat to divine blame is ultimately about apparent insincerity:
it is hard to see how, on the theological determinist’s approach, God could
legitimately blame in anything like the familiar way discussed above—i.e.,
via something like shocked or incredulous demands for explanation—
without being disingenuous.
V. A Response to the Problem
But must all divine blame include demands of this problematic sort? If
not, then we may be on our way to a solution to the problem above, as
there may be plausible models of divine blame on which theological determinism is immune to the charge that God would be insincere.
The theological determinist is helped here by recent work in moral
psychology on human blame. For not all models of such blame prioritize
aspects that lead to the problem in the divine case.
There are, for example, accounts of blame that can be classified as cognitive approaches in light of their emphasis on the role of certain kinds of
judgments in our blaming practices—in particular, negative evaluations of
the blamed person’s moral character or quality of will. Or take affective
approaches, which prioritize the role of certain emotions—e.g., anger, resentment, indignation—in their accounts of blame.29 For present purposes,
it will suffice to point out that at least some of our blaming behavior manifests either or both of the requisite cognitive or affective features, but does
not include explicit explanatory demands of those blamed. For example, Hamlet
blames Claudius for multiple offenses, as is evident in his anger and resentment, and in his evaluation of Claudius’s vicious character and lack of
regard for the former king. But Hamlet is uninterested in hearing Claudius
give any account of his wrongdoing; he makes no demands—incredulous
or otherwise—that are intended to force Claudius to acknowledge his sin.
Closer to home, I may blame the inconsiderate stranger who jumps the
line at the airport in virtue of my judgments about and emotions toward
him, with no thought of making demands of the relevant sort.30
29
See Coates and Tognazzini, “The Nature and Ethics of Blame,” 199–201, and “The Contours of Blame,” 13–15, as well as Tognazzini and Coates, “Blame,” sections 1.1 and 1.2.
30
Interestingly, Hamlet’s blame of his mother does seem to involve such demands, as we
see in his treatment of her in the “closet scene” of Act 3 (“Have you eyes?”). Similarly, if
it is not a stranger but my brother who jumps the airport line, I am much more likely to
confront him and insist, incredulously, that he explain himself. These observations may be
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Note also that there are approaches to blame that focus not on the kinds
or contents of mental states that are characteristic of blame, but rather
on the goals of our blaming behavior. For example, blame might best be
understood as a kind of protest against the vice or ill will that the blamed
person manifested in her misbehavior.31 Here again, it seems clear that
blame can sometimes serve this function without including demands of
the sort at issue. Indeed, the two examples just above plausibly count here
as well, as cognitive and affective elements will likely be typical (though
perhaps not necessary) elements of blaming activity on this approach.
These examples of blame provide a response to the problem that was
articulated in the last section. That problem, recall, was that a God who
determines an agent’s wrongdoing cannot sincerely confront that agent
with anything analogous to the kind of shocked or incredulous demand
for explanation that is common to the expression of human blame. And
thus if divine blame involves such demands, then theological determinism
has a problem with divine blame. But the considerations above cast doubt
on the antecedent. For it’s not clear why we ought to insist on certain requirements for divine blame that are frequently unsatisfied in ordinary
cases of human blame. Why, that is, ought we to think God’s blaming behavior must involve demands of the sort above when some instances of
legitimate human blame do not? In light of this, it’s open to the theological
determinist to claim that divine blame need not involve such demands,
in which case the charge of divine insincerity cannot get off the ground.
This seems to me to constitute a successful response to the challenge to
theological determinism. It’s true, of course, that ordinary human blaming
practices are not a surefire guide to understanding divine blame. But no
strong principle of that sort is needed for the response above. Rather, the
situation is this. The determinist has been presented with a challenge that
turns on divine blame taking a certain form, which renders such blame
problematic. The fact that ordinary practice commonly includes cases of
blame that do not take this form is surely relevant here. For it shows that
not all blame takes the form in question, which in turn gives us reason to
believe that divine blame need not take it either. Barring an argument that
divine blame must take this form—i.e., that it must include demands of the
sort discussed above—the problem for theological determinism appears
to have been solved.

clues that the more intimate the human relationship, the more likely it is that blame will
involve demands of the relevant kind. Or it may suggest that our blaming practices involve
a cluster of features that all appear together in only some instances of blame, where the more
intimate the relationship the more features one will typically find. Regardless, much work
would be needed to translate these considerations into a case that divine blame cannot lack
such demands, which is the crux of the present section.
31
See Coates and Tognazzini, “The Nature and Ethics of Blame,” 202, and “The Contours
of Blame,” 15–17, as well as Tognazzini and Coates, “Blame,” section 1.4.
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VI. Theological Determinism and the Psychology of Divine Blame
Still, it’s hard to deny that such blame looks very strange, at first glance
anyway. Even if the alleged problem of insincerity is solved, the fact
remains that divine blame on the theological determinist’s account appears quite alien to us. Assume, for example, that God’s blaming involves
some combination of cognitive and affective elements in the way that
was sketched in the previous section:32 God blames Peter for the denial of
Christ, where this includes negative moral evaluations of Peter’s character
or concern for Christ, along with emotions like wrath directed toward
Peter. Is there any way for us to relate to such behavior—to take up the
perspective of a being who judges and feels like this while simultaneously
determining the very behavior that occasions these judgments and emotions? Or is such behavior simply unintelligible? William Hasker puts the
concern nicely:
If we are told, then, that God has a deep and abiding anger at the unrighteous
ness that takes place on the earth, our only possible response is that this
simply cannot be: to represent God as angry and hostile to situations which
are exactly as he wishes them to be, is just incoherent—or worse, it is to represent God as afflicted with something like schizophrenia.33

Unlike Hasker, I’m not convinced that we can proclaim divine blame of
this sort to be impossible on the grounds of its unintelligibility. For there
are bound to be limits on our ability to empathize with God, cognitively
and emotionally. And the determinist seems within her rights to claim this
as an instance where the gulf between humans and the divine precludes
such empathy.
But the determinist need not concede this point and embrace a mysterian position on the matter too quickly. It’s true, of course, that we must
beware of allowing anthropomorphism undue influence on our theology;
a counterintuitive conclusion is not ipso facto a reductio, especially in the
32
Classical theologians count ascriptions of emotion (or certain emotions, like wrath)
to God as mere anthropopathisms, on the grounds that genuine divine emotions (of the
relevant sort) would violate the doctrine of divine impassibility—the doctrine that nothing
acts upon or causally affects God. (See Wainwright, “Concepts of God,” Section 2; Murray,
Reclaiming Divine Wrath; and Sanders, The God Who Risks, ch. 5.) Is the assumption in the text
above inconsistent with this aspect of classical theology? Not necessarily. For it seems to me
that an approach used by some classical theologians to explain apparent divine emotions
can be employed here as well. In particular, a theist partial to divine impassibility could
reinterpret talk of apparent emotions in divine blame as talk about certain divine actions.
(See Murray, chs. 2 and 3.) So long as such actions do not amount to punishment—i.e., so
long as instances of divine blame do not ipso facto constitute instances of divine punishment—this reinterpretation could work just fine. For example, the apparent wrath involved
in an instance of divine blame might be said to consist entirely of God’s denouncing the
offender or his behavior. Or it may be characterized as consisting of one or more divine
judgments—perhaps drawing on judgment-oriented accounts of natural emotions (as in de
Souza, “Emotion,” section 5, and Prinz, Beyond Human Nature, 242–237)—in which case the
apparent affective components of divine blame would appear to collapse into the evaluative
components.
33
William Hasker, Providence, Evil, and the Openness of God, 159.
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theological domain. But intelligibility here would seem to be a theoretical
improvement, all other things being equal. And for those whose faith
thrives best alongside understanding, it could have devotional value as
well. So it is in the determinist’s interest to seek intelligible human analogues to divine blame of the relevant sort, as a means of rendering the
divine case intelligible.
I propose that such analogues may be found in the attitudes and responses of at least some authors toward their fictional characters. I will try
to illustrate this proposal through examples, but before doing so it is
important that the claims to follow not be misunderstood. To be clear, I
will not be using the analogy below to argue that God’s goodness is consistent with divine determination of human wrongdoing or with God’s
subsequent blame for that wrongdoing. Nor will I be using it to defend
God’s standing to blame persons for actions that have been determined in
this way.34 These conclusions have all been defended in the two previous
sections. My goal in this section is different: I will be presenting some realworld, non-pathological cases in which humans seem to be judging and
feeling in ways that are analogous to the kind of divine blame sketched
above, where my sole purpose in doing so is to render the psychology of such
blame intelligible. Because these human cases are similar enough to the
divine case in relevant respects, the determinist can claim divine blame
within theological determinism to be psychologically intelligible (and
thereby avoid appeal to mystery on this point).
Let’s turn now to the central analogy of this section. It’s true of course
that there are no actual cases of human persons who have total control
over other humans’ wrongdoing and yet simultaneously blame those
wrongdoers for their actions; a fortiori there are no cases with these features
where the blame includes the cognitive and emotional elements discussed
above and is intelligible, to boot. But there are, I believe, approximations
to such cases in the attitudes of authors toward their fictional characters,
in at least some instances. That is, we find some fiction writers that exercise complete sovereignty over the behavior of their characters, and yet
nevertheless judge or respond emotionally to those characters—and all in
ways that resemble the elements of the account of blame sketched in the
section above. Take Joseph Heller, for example, on his attitudes toward
some of his characters:
I told several people while I was writing the book that Slocum was possibly the most contemptible character in literature. Before I was finished,
I began feeling sorry for him. That has happened to me before. That’s why
there are two generals in Catch-22. General Dreedle certainly had bad qualities, but then there were certain characteristics I liked (he was straightforward, honest, not a conniver), and I found I didn’t want to attribute certain

34
Todd uses the author analogy for these purposes in “Manipulation and Moral Standing,”
7. Relatedly, McCann uses the author analogy to argue that divine determination is consistent with human moral responsibility in Creation and the Sovereignty of God, 107–108.
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unsympathetic qualities to him. So I invented General Peckem as a sort of
substitute scapegoat. Very hard to like him.35

Note that Heller refers to moral evaluations (“contemptible,” “honest”)
of what are, first to last, his own creations. We see something similar in
other authors, as in Vladimir Nabokov’s evaluation of character Humbert
Humbert as “a vain and cruel wretch who manages to appear ‘touching.’”36
I suspect, however, that it is the emotional elements of divine blame
within theological determinism, and not the cognitive elements, that are
apt to seem most puzzling. In other words, my suspicion is that divine
wrath (resentment, etc.) toward those who have been determined to act
wrongly will seem less intelligible than God’s negative moral evaluation
of the action or the agent’s character. (See for example Hasker’s focus on
divine emotions in the quote above.) On this point, then, Heller’s discussion of his emotional responses (“I began feeling sorry for him,” “hard
to like”) to his creations are especially relevant. We might also contrast
J. K. Rowling’s responses to the deaths of characters Bellatrix LeStrange
(“Being able to kill her was a pleasure”) and new father Remus Lupin
(“the only time my editor ever saw me cry”).37 Indeed, while it is certainly
not a universal feature of fiction writing, there seem to be quite a few
authors who respond emotionally to the actions and fates of characters
that are entirely at their command. For some, like John Irving, this aspect
of writing seems to cast a pall over much of the process:
I can’t say I have fun writing. My stories are sad to me, and comic too, but
largely unhappy. I feel badly for the characters—that is, if the story’s any
good. Writing a novel is actually searching for victims. As I write I keep
looking for casualties. The stories uncover the casualties.38

I hope the relevance of these examples is clear. God’s blaming activity
on theological determinism may prima facie seem unintelligible, as it may
appear impossible to relate to the practice of evaluating and (especially)
responding emotionally to behavior that one has determined oneself. But
we find approximations to such practices in the judgments and emotions
of many fiction writers. And while it may be difficult for some of us to
relate to such authors in these respects, there nevertheless seems to be
no good reason to describe their behavior as unintelligible. But then we
have found what we were seeking, namely, a psychologically intelligible
human analogue to the kind of divine blame in question. It is not a perfect
analogy, to be sure. But it doesn’t need to be perfect. It only needs to show
Heller, “The Art of Fiction No. 51.”
Nabokov, “The Art of Fiction No. 40.”
37
See Rowling, “I’ve Really Exhausted the Magical,” and Loughrey, “J. K. Rowling Apologizes for Killing Off Remus Lupin in Harry Potter,” respectively. Note that Rowling specifies
that her tears were over the fate of Teddy Lupin, the infant son of Remus, upon his father’s
death. Even so, the point holds: pleasure is taken in the death of the wicked, displeasure in
the death of the virtuous.
38
Irving, “The Art of Fiction No. 93.”
35
36
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the intelligibility of thinking and feeling towards one’s creations in ways
that sufficiently approximate the relevant kind of divine blame, so as to
make such blame itself intelligible. And this it does.
One might worry that the divine case is too dissimilar to the proposed
human analogue for the analogy to serve its purpose, contrary to my claim
just above. Particular concern might come from the fact that in our engagement with fiction, either as authors or consumers, we believe of the
characters that they are fictional, i.e., merely imaginary. But the human targets of God’s blame are as real as can be, and (obviously) God takes them
to be so. Doesn’t this imply a difference that is sufficient to undermine the
analogy?
It does not. To see why, it’s important to keep in mind that my sole aim
in using the analogy is to defend the psychological intelligibility of divine
blame within theological determinism, where such blame is assumed to
be the evaluative and emotional sort discussed above. The analogy highlights the similarity between divine blame (so understood) and cases of
human authors blaming their fictional characters, with the conclusion
that this similarity is such that the intelligibility of the human case renders God’s blame intelligible as well. And, to return to the worry at hand,
while it is certainly true that we believe of fictional characters that they
are merely imaginary, it’s nevertheless plausible that fiction provokes in
us real emotional and evaluative attitudes toward those characters.39 This
may be puzzling, but it seems to be a puzzling fact about us. Colin Radford
captured this fact nicely many years ago, noting that while we do not rush
the stage to stop Tybalt’s violent behavior—we know we are watching a
play, after all—we respond with genuine emotion to what we see:
We shed real tears for Mercutio. They are not crocodile tears, they are
dragged from us and they are not the sort of tears that are produced by
cigarette smoke in the theatre. . . . We are appalled when we realise what
may happen, and are horrified when it does. Indeed, we may be so appalled
at the prospect of what we think is going to happen to a character in a novel
or a play that some of us can’t go on. We avert the impending tragedy in the
only way we can, by closing the book, or leaving the theatre.40

This kind of sorrow for fictional victims is matched by our indignation
toward and condemnation of fictional villains, to come back to emotions
and evaluations that are more relevant to our discussion. And as seems
clear in the writers used as examples above, these attitudes are not limited
to consumers of fiction, but extend to the authors of the works as well.
39
See for example Gendler, “Imagination,” section 5.3, and Neill, “Fiction and the Emotions.” Note however that there is not perfect consensus about this; see Kendall Walton’s
“Fearing Fictions” for dissent. Note also that some who work in this area believe that we
respond to fiction with genuine emotions, but we are irrational in doing so. Radford is emblematic here—see his “How Can We Be Moved by the Fate of Anna Karenina?”—and thus
my use of his work in the text should not be taken as an endorsement of the entirety of his
position.
40
Radford, “How Can We Be Moved by the Fate of Anna Karenina?,” 70. See also 71.
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Moreover, this all seems perfectly intelligible, regardless of whether one
is a consumer or an author of the work. But then all the pieces are in place
for the analogy to succeed in its aim, as we have intelligible cases in which
persons blame that over which they exercise complete control.
It may clarify matters to note that the fictional aspects of the human
analogue would matter a great deal more if the hope were to defend the
intelligibility of God’s punishing those who have been divinely determined.
For insofar as it even makes sense to punish fictional characters, such punishment would presumably have to take place within the fictional story,
and thus the punishment would be just as imaginary as the characters
themselves. But blame, as understood here, is as real as can be, whether
targeted at fictional or actual objects. This makes the analogy to God’s
blame apt in the present case, even if it would fail to support a similar
conclusion about divine punishment.41
Alternatively, one might object to the analogy on the grounds that a fiction writer’s creative process is one in which the characters take on “a life
of their own,” as it were, dictating the course of the story rather than falling
under the strict control of the author. In response, it’s certainly true that
some writers talk this way—Khaled Hosseini,42 for example, and perhaps
E. M. Forster.43 But it’s hard to know just how seriously to take this kind
of language. More to the point, however, even if some authors speak this
way, there are others who describe the creative process very differently,
including some of those cited earlier in support of the analogy. A colorful
example comes from Nabokov, commenting snidely on the idea that characters exercise this kind of “control”:
My knowledge of Mr. Forster’s works is limited to one novel, which I dislike;
and anyway, it was not he who fathered that trite little whimsy about characters getting out of hand; it is as old as the quills, although of course one
sympathizes with his people if they try to wriggle out of that trip to India or
wherever he takes them. My characters are galley slaves.

Given that at least some authors respond evaluatively and emotionally,
in the relevant ways, to characters whose behavior they have determined
completely, the analogy is fitting.

41
Most people who are concerned about determinism and divine blame will also be concerned about determinism and divine punishment. Thus, some readers may be disappointed
that I have not explicitly defended God’s standing to punish those who have been divinely
determined, and similarly, that I have defended the intelligibility of divine blame via a proposal that seems irrelevant to the intelligibility of divine punishment. In response, I’ll just
reiterate something I said in an earlier section: because I count issues concerning divine
blame and issues concerning divine punishment as related but distinct, I don’t expect that
what illuminates our thinking about the one will always illuminate our thinking about the
other. Even so, I count it worthwhile to seek improvements in our understanding of the one,
even if these do not immediately yield the same amount or kind of improvement in the other.
42
See Hosseini, “‘Kite Runner’ Author On His Childhood, His Writing, And The Plight Of
Afghan Refugees.”
43
Nabokov, “The Art of Fiction No. 40.”
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But what if the human analogues were much more similar to the divine case? In other words, what if we consider not real human authors,
but fantastic “superhuman” authors, who—somewhat like the narrator in
Breakfast of Champions—have the power to create and control real worlds,
with real people performing real actions? Suppose also that these authors
blame the creations that are under their control. Do we find such blame
intelligible? If not, we have the makings of another objection: when we
make the analogous human (or superhuman) blame much more similar
to the divine case, that blame ceases to be intelligible; but the best analogy
should comprise analogues that are as similar as possible in relevant respects; therefore, we cannot argue by analogy that the divine blame of
interest here is intelligible.
I think we should resist this line of thought. For I can’t think of a better
way to evaluate the intelligibility of the outlandish superhuman blame than
to think about the superhuman author’s creation, control, and blame as
being substantially similar to a normal author’s process. And if this is our
approach, then we should judge the blame in the fantastic case to be intelligible, just as we do in the case of normal human authors. Thus, even
if we switch to the more exotic analogue—and I’m not convinced that we
should—the analogy still supports the conclusion that divine blame within
theological determinism is intelligible.
That said, there may be one way in which our judgments about superhuman authorship and normal authorship vary significantly, over and
above the obvious difference in the authors’ abilities. In particular, we (or
many of us) may judge that a superhuman author, unlike a normal author, is doing something morally wrong in creating as she does. For, as we
have imagined her, she brings real people into existence, with real lives
that include wrongdoing and (presumably) suffering. But crucially, she
does this without the knowledge, wisdom, power, and moral perfection
that are present in God’s creative and providential acts. And some might
take these divine qualities to be necessary conditions on morally permissible creation (regardless, perhaps, of whether the creator determines the
creatures’ behavior or instead allows them to lead “lives of their own.”)
The important thing to see for present purposes is that even if you judge
superhuman authors to be acting immorally, this is irrelevant to the main
argument of this section. For the goal of the present section—the end that
the central analogy serves—is to defend the intelligibility of divine blame
within theological determinism, not to defend God’s goodness within this
approach. (Defense of the latter has been provided by others, and was
reviewed to some extent in section IV.) And neither the objection we have
just considered, nor the previous two objections, give us reason to doubt
the intelligibility of such blame.
Appeal to mystery is unavoidable for the Christian theist. But the timing
of that appeal will vary, depending on one’s theology. The upshot of the
above is that theological determinists can, if they wish, delay mysterianism
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a little longer than it might initially have appeared, in light of the fact that
divine blame on their account is intelligible after all.
VII. Conclusion
Although the term “theological determinism” may not be common in the
pews, the position that it names has long been a part of select Christian
denominations. These denominations tend not to prioritize passages like
the “Song of the Vineyard” from Isaiah when articulating their doctrine
of divine sovereignty, and such passages are typically not interpreted as a
realistic depiction of divine psychology. Far more priority is given instead
to passages like Romans 9, which is often interpreted as an endorsement
of both theological determinism and legitimate divine blame, and which
famously includes the following:
You will say to me then, “Why then does he still find fault? For who can
resist his will?” But who indeed are you, a human being, to argue with God?
Will what is molded say to the one who molds it, “Why have you made me
like this?”44

The sentiments in this and similar passages,45 so interpreted, raise a number
of philosophical questions. In previous sections I have argued for the appropriateness of divine blame, and presented real-world human analogues
in an effort to render such blame intelligible. But many other important
questions have been bracketed here. Human moral responsibility has been
assumed rather than defended; the justness of divine punishment has been
left unaddressed; and the question of how to respond to the problem of
evil has been given only a passing glance. Thus, philosophically-minded
Christians must look elsewhere for answers to these other questions—or
propose new solutions of their own.46
Romans 9: 19–20, NRSV.
For discussion of more Biblical passages often taken to support Christian theological
determinism, see Carson, Divine Sovereignty and Human Moral Responsibility, and Feinberg,
No One Like Him, 677–714.
46
For treatment of one or more of these issues, see Churchill, “Intuition, Orthodoxy, and
Moral responsibility,” 188–189; Cowan and Welty, “Pharaoh’s Magicians Redivivus,” 163–164
and 168–172; Edwards, Freedom of the Will, part IV; Feinberg, No One Like Him, chs. 14 and
16; Flint, “Two Accounts of Providence,” 169–170, and “Divine Providence,” 269; Helm, The
Providence of God, chs. 7 and 8, and Eternal God, 144–164; McCann, Creation and the Sovereignty
of God, chs. 5 and 6; and Sommers, “Relative Responsibility and Theism.” Also relevant are
recent defenses of non-libertarian approaches to the problem of evil in John Martin Fischer,
“Libertarianism and the Problem of Flip-flopping,” 61n14, T. J. Mawson, “Classical Theism
has No Implications for the Debate between Libertarianism and Compatibilism,” 148–150,
and O’Connor, “Against Theological Determinism,” 134–135. (Exposition of contemporary
non-libertarian approaches to moral responsibility may likewise be of interest; see McKenna
and Coates, “Compatibilism,” for a thorough overview, and ch. 8 of Valerie Tiberius’s Moral
Psychology for a brief introduction.) For objections to theological determinism that do not
turn on challenges to divine blame, see the references just above to O’Connor (135–140) and
Mawson (154); see also Boyd, Satan and the Problem of Evil, chs. 2–3 and appendix 5; Flint,
Divine Providence, 90–94, and “Divine Providence,” 268–269; Neal Judisch, “Theological Determinism and the Problem of Evil” and “Divine Conservation and Creaturely Freedom,”
239–243; Katherin Rogers, “The Divine Controller Argument for Incompatibilism”; Sanders,
44
45
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Progress here, whether in the form of new proposals or of renewed
comprehension and timely application of the old, is to be welcomed for
two reasons. The first stems from the fact, mentioned above, that theological determinism has long been common among theologians, clergy,
and laity alike. Those Christian philosophers interested in defending a
“big tent” vision of the rationality of Christian belief—and who wouldn’t
want to be in that number?—will thus want to defend this common position against charges that it suffers from one or another defeater. The
second is that this approach to divine sovereignty, unlike some alternative approaches, does not require that humans have libertarian free will
in order to be morally responsible. On Christian theological determinism,
our responsibility is compatible with a wide range of discoveries in the
science of human agency, rather than being hostage to the truth of some
rather risky empirical hypotheses.47 It seems only prudent, therefore, for
Christian philosophers to try to meet the various challenges to theological
determinism, regardless of their personal inclinations on the position. Or
anyway, it seems prudent for those keen to give moral responsibility—a
central commitment across Christian denominations—an especially firm
foundation.48
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